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  ABSTRACT 
 
This study examines ways to prevent the success of a 
small boat attack (SBA) against a larger high value 
commercial vessel, or high value unit (HVU), through 
the utilization of an agent-based simulation.  The 
geographic area of concern is the Straits of Malacca.  
An essential element of the scenario is the limited time 
available to act against the attackers.  Subsequently, 
the two alternatives considered are the deployment of 
patrol craft, as well as the placement of well-armed 
Sea Marshals on each high value ship.   
1 INTRODUCTION 
Commercial shipping vessels use shipping lanes that 
transit vast expanses of desolate ocean area.  These 
shipping lanes pass through marine territory that is 
barely, if at all, monitored or policed by forces that 
could protect or assist any merchant vessels that 
become distressed.  This vulnerability, coupled with 
the quantity and value of cargo that is shipped on the 
open seas, provides a potential target for terrorists that 
were intent on disrupting the global economy.   
This research is part of a larger study that 
examined Maritime Domain Protection in the Straits 
of Malacca. The focus here is to examine ways to 
prevent the success of a small boat attack (SBA) 
against a larger high value commercial vessel, or high 
value unit (HVU), through the utilization and analysis 
of an agent-based simulation.  While the geographic 
area of concern is the Straits of Malacca, particularly 
near the extremely busy port of Singapore, the results 
of this analysis were extended to other ports and their 
local waterways. 
 9882 SCENARIO 
The scenario was a small boat attack (SBA), designed 
to demonstrate the quick reaction capabilities of the 
maritime domain protection system. It was based on 
the French tanker Limburg attack off the coast of 
Yemen, where a speedboat carrying explosives 
rammed and blew a hole in the side of the tanker.  The 
scenario called fr an explosives-laden small boat to 
attack a merchant vessel transiting the Strait of 
Malacca.   
The small boat was approximately seven meters 
long, capable of 30 knots, and loaded with 1000 
pounds of TNT armed with both an impact fuse and a 
remote detonator. The SBA scenario was set around 
midday with standard environmental conditions for the 
region. The scenario had the small boat exiting from a 
fairly narrow portion of the Straits that is frequently 
congested. This allows the maritime domain protection 
system to be tested against a very time-critical target, 
in a congested traffic area. The SBA scenario forced 
the system to react in a timely manner and to be 
selective enough to define not only the attack, but also 
to determine which ship is the target of the attack so 
that it can be defended.   A graphic of the scenario is 
below in Figure 1. 
3 FORCE RESPONSE ALTERNATIVES  
While a variety of possible force response alternatives 
were considered, two significant operational 
requirements resulted in the final consideration of just 
two distinct alternatives.  The first limitation to a 
broader set of alternatives was time available to any 
response team.   The chosen scenario dictated that 
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Figure 1: Small Boat Attack in MANA 
 
only minutes were available to have a capable force 
response in place to stop an attack.  The second 
limitation was the need to stop the attacker before it 
was within 80 meters of the HVU.  This would prevent 
significant damage to the commercial vessel, even if 
the TNT was detonated at that range. 
 Essentially, these requirements meant that the 
force response capability had to be in place before an 
attack.  Therefore, the two alternatives consisted of the 
use of patrol crafts to protect HVUs as they transit the 
Straits of Malacca, as well as the use of onboard Sea 
Marshals that would act as an organic defensive unit 
for the HVU.    
 In the first alternative there were six Sparviero (an 
Italian-made vessel) patrol craft conducting a 
continuous patrol pattern in the Straits. The Straits 
were divided into two sectors, with three patrol craft 
each. This was believed to be the most effective use of 
the craft to counter the terrorist threat.  
 The Sea Marshal team alternative consisted of a 
three man team, with two crew served weapons and 
one observer.  The team members were to be placed 
onboard the HVU prior to the attack commencing, 
meaning some time prior entering the Straits. This 
follows procedure, as the HVUs would be identified 
prior to entering the most dangerous part of their 
journey. 
4 MODELING AND ANALYSIS 
4.1 Operational Design Parameters 
The three factors that were of most concern in the 
analysis of force response options were: 
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1. Engagement range  
2. Probability of kill per single engagement    
(PKSE)  
3. Number of HVUs in the area of responsibility 
(AOR). 
 
It was assumed that the Sea Marshals would 
have rules of engagement (ROE) in place to actively 
engage any threat that came within a certain 
engagement range of the HVU. The engagement range 
was varied from 100 meters to 240 meters in 20 meter 
increments.   On the other hand, the patrol craft 
alternative had the capability to go beyond the horizon 
at great distances.  Its values ranged from 9 to 50 
nautical miles.   
PKSE was varied to show the effect that training 
and readiness levels would have on the engagement.  
PKSE was set from 0.3 to 1.0 for both alternatives.  A 
full factorial simulation experiment was conducted 
with each treatment consisting of fifty replications.  
Figure 3 shows the contour plot for the probability of 
kill (at distance greater than 80 meters) considering 
PKSE and initial engagement range. 
Finally, the number of patrol craft used and the 
Number of HVUs to protect were varied only for the 
Patrol Craft alternative.  First, it was of interest to 
determine how much improvement in P(def) would 
occur when increasing the number of patrol craft in 
use.  Additionally, the patrol craft alternative provided 
a chance to examine the effect of trying to protect 
various numbers of HVUs with a specific patrol of 
Sparviero craft.  For the Sea Marshal alternative, on 
the other hand, it was assumed that each designated 
HVU would have a team placed aboard.  A summary 
of these factors and the values they were assigned for 
MANA model are found in the table below. 
 
Table 1: Significant Modeling Factors 
 
4.2 Performance Measures 
The primary performance measure was the probability 
that an attack was defeated by the defending force 
P(def), represented by either the patrol craft or the sea 
Factor Values 
Evaluated 
PKSE 0.3 – 1.0 
Patrol Craft 1-50 Number of 
HVUs Sea Marshals 1 
Patrol Craft 3 - 9 Number of 
Patrol Craft Sea Marshals N/A 
Patrol Craft 
 
9-50 nautical miles  
Engagement 
Range Sea Marshals 100 – 240 meters 
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significant measure, that was addressed as a minimum 
requirement.  Essentially, if the force response team 
could not defeat the attackers within the time needed 
to prevent the attackers from getting within minimum 
distance, the attack was a success.  Of additional 
interest, for the patrol craft option, was to examine 
both the number of HVUs that could be adequately 
protected and the number of patrol craft that would 
provide the best level of protection.    
 
4.3 MANA Agent Based Simulation 
 
The agent-based simulation used in this effort was 
Map Aware Non-Uniform Automata (MANA).  
MANA was developed by the New Zealand Defence 
Technology Agency to analyze the effect of chaos and 
complexity theory in armed conflict.  MANA is 
considered a distillation since it has the characteristics 
of transparency, speed, ease of answering specific 
questions, and requires little training to use.   
A major advantage of MANA is that as an agent-
based model, its entities are not controlled by central, 
predetermined, decision-making algorithms, but make 
their own decisions as they adapt to the environment.  
Thus, MANA is a good tool for exploration.  Because 
of the nature of MANA and other agent-based models, 
behavioral characteristics of entities could be 
represented and defined. However, for the purposes of 
this research, these traits were assigned and 
maintained as constants throughout all of the 
alternatives. This allowed the model to focus on 
isolating operational performance.  An example of 
these types of behavior representations in MANA is 
red force hostility, which was set at a high degree. 
Another major benefit of using the MANA 
package was the ability to realistically represent the 
scenario. Current intelligence reports show that the 
most likely attack scenario would be a vessel 
disguised as a fishing vessel, which would operate 
covertly near a choke point until a target of 
opportunity passed within range. This capability was 
easily modeled using the MANA software package. In 
the scenario the red vessel was identical in appearance 
to all of the other thirty-five fishing vessels in the area.  
4.4 Model Results 
The overall modeling results showed that the Sea 
Marshal alternative had a better probability of success 
than the Patrol Craft alternative.  Specifically, for 
Patrol Craft alternative (using 3 Patrol Craft), P(def) 
was 60%.  For the Sea Marshal alternative, P(def) was 
990 
92.5%, even at a moderate setting of PKSS = 0.5 and 
range of engagement of 150 meters.  Figure 2 below 
shows the entire breadth of engagement ranges and 
PKSS that were varied in MANA for the Sea Marshall 
Alternative, with the mean P(def) identified by the 
various colors labeled in the legend. 
 
Figure 2: Contour plot for Sea Marshal Alternative 
 
Figure 3 below shows the range of values for 
P(def) for the Patrol Craft alternative as both the 
number of Patrol Craft vessels (Sparviero) and the 
number of HVUs being guarded were varied.  It shows 
that doubling the number of patrol craft from 3 to 6 
would result in an expected increase in P(def) of 
approximately 0.2, regardless of the number of HVUs. 
 
 
Figure 3: Contour plot for Patrol Craft Alternative 
 
As an excursion of the scenario, the Sparviero 
vessels were used as convoy assets.  The results from 
MANA showed that the number of HVUs inside the 
protected area was irrelevant. The patrol craft escort, 
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using 3 Sparvieros, was capable of defending up to 50 
HVUs with P(def) slightly higher than 0.9. This led to 
the recommendation that the Sparviero vessels be used 
as a convoy escort rather than as a traditional patrol 
craft.  
5 CONCLUSIONS  
The primary conclusion from this study was that the 
use of sea marshals armed with crew served weapons 
is the best way to counter a small boat attack against 
an HVU.  An additional finding was that the escort of 
HVU convoy produced a noticeable improvement over 
patrolling.   
Additionally, it is apparent that the weapon range 
and PKSE affect have important impact on P(def). This 
is particularly true when considering weapons with 
extended range and precision such as the over the 
horizon missile system.  While this system was 
included as a possibility alternative for this study, the 
operational feasibility of such a weapon may be 
questionable.  In a cluttered environment such as the 
Straits of Malacca, it would take much risk of 
collateral damage to fire such a weapon at great 
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